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Abstract
In this paper we develop a theoretical model that investigates the demand for cultural goods
under the assumption of cultural capital and rational addiction. We also consider the effect of
a policy intervention in order to raise the initial stock of cultural capital of a given individual,
both on individual demand and on supply. Finally, we discuss on the effectiveness of such
policies by translating our model to a dynamic framework.
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In this paper, we address the in￿ uence of cultural policies on the demand of private cultural
goods. We are interested in determining the e⁄ect of the public provision of cultural goods
on the private demand of cultural goods on di⁄erent life periods. We start by proposing an
static two-period model that investigates the e⁄ect of di⁄erent variables on the demand of
market goods and then discuss the e⁄ectiveness of a given cultural policy in the light of the
private demand pattern. One of the most relevant speci￿c characteristic of cultural goods is
derived from a temporal e⁄ect in their consumption, since past levels of consumption have
an e⁄ect on subsequent ones: those individuals who have consumed more cultural goods in
the past are more likely to consume a large quantity today. Economic analysis has proposed
alternative ways of overcoming arguments such as changes in tastes or increasing marginal
utility. We will shortly discuss two of them.
Rational addiction models -as per Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy
(1988)- explain the positive e⁄ect of past consumption of cultural goods on present
consumption by means of the accumulation of past cultural experiences that are transformed
into culture consumption capital, which increases the productivity of current consumption of
cultural goods when ful￿lling cultural needs. This skill is accumulative, agents are expected
to improve their technology as they consume more and more. These models have been shown
to be useful in explaining culture demand behavior since the seminal papers by Becker. In
fact, one of the examples addressed by Stigler and Becker (1977) is a model for music demand.
Derived "learning-by-consuming" models, take into account the experience good
characteristic exhibited by cultural goods. LØvy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) study
consumer behavior in regard to the arts in a very broad sense. There is a commodity that
performs as an argument of the utility function that is called cultural appreciation (we will
build upon this concept and refer to it or to cultural experience), which is produced by
purchasing cultural goods in the market. The productivity of these market cultural goods in
producing cultural appreciation depends on a variety of factors, for instance, on individual
skills (in the sense of the presence of some sensitivity and cultural keys that are needed to
recognize some cultural value in the cultural good, so that it may be enjoyable). They focus
their analysis on demand for cultural appreciation (since they concentrate on the argument
of the utility function) and derive its main properties, without determining the demand for
the cultural market goods.
Our proposed model depart from LØvy-Garboua and Montmaquette and di⁄ers in two
key aspects: (i) we are interested in the analysis of the demand for cultural goods, since
cultural appreciation is an intangible construction while the behavior of the individual in
the market in terms of his/her demand for cultural goods is observable, and (ii) it allows us
to study the possibilities for public intervention in a overlapping-generations framework.
We draw up a model to study the consumption of cultural goods and then use it to
analyze to which extend can public intervention take place. The main assumptions of the
model are the following: (i) tastes are invariant over time, and (ii) the arguments of the
utility function are a limited set of objects -commodities- that are produced and consumed
by individuals.
1We present a model of cultural appreciation and solve it. Then, we analyze the
determinants of the demand for cultural goods and the e⁄ects for di⁄erent periods. Sections
3 and 4 deal with the in￿ uence of initial consumption on subsequent demand and the optimal
intertemporal consumption path. Section 5 discusses the role of cultural policies in our static
framework and extends it to a simple dynamic setting. Section 6 presents a discusion and
summarizes our conclusions.
2 The model
The theoretical model makes some simpli￿cations in order to focus interest on the market
behavior of the individual regarding cultural goods. First, we consider only two needs:
cultural appreciation (X) and a non-cultural need (Y ). We consider only two consumption
market goods: a cultural good (x), and a numeraire (y). Third, we restrict our attention to
the case of two time periods, we consider the intertemporal cultural goods choice decision in
youth and adulthood.
Let us de￿ne the following utility function
U1 (X1;Y1) + ￿U2 (X2;Y2) (1)
Ut (Xt;Yt) = ￿lnXt + (1 ￿ ￿)lnYt (2)
There is a market for each good and the budget constraint is represented by
px1 + y1 + ￿(px2 + y2) = w (3)
We have to specify the relationship between basic needs and market goods. Both needs
are ful￿lled by the production and consumption of their respective commodities using market
goods. For the non-cultural good we assume that there is an identity production function
Yt = yt for t = 1;2 (4)
Cultural appreciation is produced by the use of two production factors: the cultural good
xt, and cultural capital st that enables the good to be enjoyed. The cultural capital measure
captures the ability to interpret and enjoy cultural goods purchased. In our model, this is
a part of personal human capital. A positive quantity of cultural capital is needed for any
appreciation to be produced. We postulate the same production function as LØvy-Garboua
and Montmarquette:1
Xt = xtst for t = 1;2 (5)
The available amount of cultural capital for a consumer in period t is determined by preceding
levels of cultural good consumption. Let: st = rst￿1 + xt￿1, with s1 being the initial
cultural capital stock, exogenously determined, and r 2 [0;1] the cultural capital survival
rate, interpreted as the "memory" of our consumer. The cultural goods consumed in the
previous period are also the net investment that increases the available cultural capital stock
1They interpret it in terms of the transformation of cultural goods into appreciation on the basis of the
quality of the good
2for the current period. We will use the accumulation law: s2 = rs+x1:The parameter s is of
particular interest for cultural policies, since it can be partially controlled by policy makers.
We write our consumer problem as follows:
Max
fx1;x2;y1;y2g
￿lnX1 + (1 ￿ ￿)lnY1 + ￿ (￿lnX2 + (1 ￿ ￿)lnY2)
s.t.
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Xt = xtst for t = 1;2
Yt = yt
s2 = rs + x1












































3 The determinants of the demand for cultural goods
The following table summarizes the e⁄ect of the determinants of cultural good consumption
in each period and for the aggregate in terms of lifetime optimal demand.
First Period Second Period Lifetime
Initial stock (s) - + -
Survival (r) - + -
Income (w) + + +




Price (p) - - -
Nearly all the derivatives with respect to each parameter have the expected signs. Higher
income and greater taste for cultural appreciation have a positive e⁄ect on the demand for
cultural goods, whereas a higher price (p) leads to lower demand. However, the speci￿c
determinants of cultural addiction - initial endowment (s) and survival rate(r) - have opposite
e⁄ects for each period, so the rest of the section is given over to analyzing the roles of these
parameters. In what follows, we will focus on the role of the initial endowment of cultural
capital s.2
Lemma 1 Cultural demand in the ￿rst period is decreasing in the initial endowment of
cultural capital.
2It is important to remark that the optimal demand for cultural goods in each period is symmetric with
respect to parameters s and r. We can thus, extend the conclusions derived for any of them. This is obvious,
since the term rs appears in the capital law of motion. This means that the solution to the maximization
problem is also symmetric.
3Any change in s has two e⁄ects on the demand for cultural goods in period 2: a direct
e⁄ect and an indirect one through cultural goods consumption in period 1 to be integrated













@s . The direct e⁄ect turns
out to be positive and the indirect e⁄ect is negative. We concentrate on low values of s,
since we analyze the total impact evaluated at s = 0, and perform numeric simulations.
Lemma 2 The demand for cultural goods in the second period is increasing in the initial
endowment of cultural capital for low values of it.
Once we know how the demand varies in each period as a reaction to changes in the
initial cultural capital stock, we must analyze what happens with lifetime demand, i.e. the
sum of demand for the ￿rst and second periods. It depends on cultural preferences, (￿),
temporal discount (￿) and interest rate (￿).
Lemma 3 Lifetime demand is decreasing in the initial cultural capital for low values of
s if and only if ￿ <
￿(1+￿)
(￿+￿) .
4 Past and current consumption
We now verify that a rational addiction model does in fact generate the empirical regularity
that people who consumed a lot of cultural goods in the past also consume a lot in the
present. We can conclude that our model predicts the empirical regularity; actually, we can
analyze the in￿ uence of the parameters on the extent of the in￿ uence of past consumption
on current consumption.
Lemma 4 The bigger r, s and
￿
￿, the greater the in￿uence of early consumption on adult
consumption.
Since consumption in the ￿rst period has a temporal e⁄ect by making the agent more
productive for the second, it is no longer true that the consumption path only depends
on the relationship between ￿ and ￿, as is the case for a standard economic intertemporal
maximization problem. The optimallity conditions that arises from ￿rst order conditions are



































￿, we can conclude that for the case
￿
￿ = 1, the optimal consumption
path is decreasing. The constant consumption path, x￿
1 = x￿
2, is de￿ned by the following







￿:Solving for the value of ￿ in






rs + (1 + ￿)x￿
1
(7)
4The area that represents the pairs (￿,￿) for which the optimal consumption path is
decreasing, is bigger than the area under the standard model. That is, cultural addiction
leads to more likely decreasing paths.
The ￿gure below represents the ￿ = :2;w = 100;p = 5;s = 1;r = :9 case.
Trends over time of the demand for cultural goods
Could the e⁄ect that incentivates cultural capital accumulation be so strong that it eliminates
increasing cultural consumption paths? From the following lemma, we can conclude that
capital accumulation is never so attractive as to make increasing paths disappear. For some
combinations of the parameters ￿;p;r;s and w, there will always be increasing cultural
consumption paths.
Lemma 5 For our model, (i) the function ￿￿ (￿) is increasing and concave on ￿; and (ii)
lim
￿!1
￿￿ (￿) > 1
2.
5 On the role of cultural policies
To analyze the impact of culture policies oriented towards increasing the endowment of
cultural capital, we consider two di⁄erent scenarios: (i) the two-period individual decision
model discussed above, and (ii) a derived overlapping generations model.
Since lifetime demand is decreasing on the initial conditions of cultural capital, any
increase in the initial endowment due to an active culture policy will induce a drop in
individual lifetime demand. This result is bad news for the culture supply sector, which
will thus face lower demand. However, we have to take into consideration the instrument of
cultural policy to be used. Let us consider that the government wants to increase the initial
stock of cultural goods by means of a transfer of goods 3. The government assumes an active
role as a demander of cultural goods for transfer to consumers. The e⁄ect of such a policy
on the culture sector is ambiguous, since there will be two e⁄ects on opposite directions: a
drop in lifetime demand and an increase in demand due to public purchasing.
To determine the total e⁄ect for low initial cultural capital endowments, we evaluate the
















(1+￿+￿￿)(1+￿)￿: The absolute value of this derivative is lower than one. For low initial
endowments of cultural capital an increase due to active culture policies that transfer goods
3Think of a unique cultural good called "theater performances". Then consider the instrument of active
culture policy as free tickets for schools.
5is bene￿cial for the culture supply sector, since it increases the total demand for cultural
goods.4
To study the long term e⁄ectiveness of policies of this type, we now extend our model to
a dynamic framework of overlapping generations. We characterize individual behavior
by means of individuals that solve system (6), and take into account the inherited nature
of part of the initial stock of cultural capital. We consider that an individual￿ s cultural
consumption for the second period will be transmitted to his or her o⁄spring as their initial
cultural capital endowment.
The dynamics of cultural consumption derived from these assumptions has a steady
state point s￿ that acts as an overall attractor of the dynamic system. It is de￿ned by
the capital stock that makes demand for culture in the second period equal to the capital
stock. Graphically, this is represented by the intersection of the culture demand curve for
the second period and the 45 degrees line.
Lemma 6 The dynamic system converges to a steady state point s￿.
The sketch of the proof goes as follows. We prove ￿rst that the demand for cultural goods
in the second period will cross the main diagonal from left to right. We will use results derived
from the algebraic results for s = 0, together with numerical simulations. The demand for





p > 0: Further,
the slope of the demand curve is lower than one (which is the slope of the main diagonal)















￿ 1: For realistic values of the parameters,
particularly for small values of ￿, this expression is negative. So we can conclude that the
slope at the origin is indeed lower than one. Finally, numerical simulations show that demand
for culture in the second period is concave, so the culture demand curve becomes ￿ atter.
These three steps guarantee the existence of an overall attractor.
A culture policy implemented at a single moment in time has no e⁄ect on cultural goods
consumption in the long run. The short-run e⁄ect will depend on the quantity of cultural
capital available at a given time: for initial endowments below the steady state point s￿,
the transfer of cultural goods accelerates convergence to the steady state point. However,
for higher initial endowments, such public intervention delays the fall of the capital stock
to the steady state point. The government may manipulate the level of the steady state
point by controlling for two parameters: the price of cultural goods (by price subsidies), and
individual incomes (by means of money transfers).
6 Conclusions
The e⁄ect of a change in some of the determinants of demand, such as price, income, and
cultural preference, operates in the same direction as a model of optimal intertemporal choice
of non-addictive goods. They all have monotonic e⁄ects on both periods, leading to a positive
change in lifetime demand (negative in the case of price). However, the parameters that
4This conclusion also extends to high values of cultural capital since numerical simulations prove that
lifetime demand is decreasing on s.
6characterize the composition of the cultural capital available in each period (an exogenously
given cultural capital endowment and a survival capital rate) have di⁄erent e⁄ects: they
have a negative e⁄ect in the ￿rst period and a positive one in the second. A change in either
of these parameters causes a fall in lifetime demand. We argue that this result is explained
by the double nature of cultural goods consumption in the ￿rst period: on the one hand they
are demanded as a consumption good to be used for the ful￿llment of that period￿ s cultural
needs; on the other they are demanded because they are a capital good that is integrated as
a net investment into the cultural capital stock.
We also examine the e⁄ect of cultural goods consumption in early years on demand
for cultural goods in adulthood, and draw two main conclusions: The demand for cultural
goods in adulthood increases from the initial demand, so our theoretical model predicts
the empirical ￿nding that individuals who consume more cultural goods as children also
consume more as adults. Regarding the variation of consumption paths over time, our
model establishes that for two periods, although some combinations of the parameters lead
to an increasing path, combinations for decreasing paths are more frequent. West and McKee
(1983), empirically compare the alternative arguments of rational addiction and merit goods
to study the case of education in Great Britain. One of the results concerning variations
over time in their paper (which is discussed in LØvy-Garboua and Montmarquette) is that
under rational addiction there may be a threshold for demand for this type of goods, so
consumption has a slight initial increase that undergoes a strong acceleration as soon as
the e⁄ect on taste formation becomes stronger. From our model, unfortunately, we cannot
generalize to many periods to check whether this e⁄ect is also present for cultural goods.
Lastly, we have obtained some results from the discussion on the e⁄ects of an active
culture policy in terms of transfer of cultural goods to individuals, so their initial endowment
of cultural capital increases. From our analysis we draw these conclusions:
(a) From the static model: An active cultural policy can be justi￿ed since it will be
bene￿cial for cultural goods suppliers.
(b) From the overlapping generation model: This policy is only e⁄ective in the short
run, since the dynamics of cultural capital lead to a steady state point. This steady
state point depends however on other variables that can be modi￿ed by the government
(price and income), so other types of public intervention may take place.
One of the arguments invoked by Musgrave (1987) in his characterization of merit goods
is the possibility of "paternalist" behavior on redistribution policies by the government: for
such cases, the donor imposes his own preferences to the receiver. This way, the government
does not decide how much income to transfer, but what kind of goods are transferred to force
their consumption on the basis of their meritorious nature. Starting from this argument, we
discuss the e⁄ects of di⁄erent policy actions from a consumer￿ s point of view.
We can speculate on the e⁄ectiveness of a public-sector culture policy oriented towards
an increase in demand for cultural goods by means of three alternative instruments. The ￿rst
possibility is that the government will transfer free cultural goods to children; the second
one is an income transfer, and the third one a subsidy for cultural goods producers to bring
7prices down. As we know from our intratemporal optimality conditions, under the second
and the third alternatives not all extra real income will be dedicated to demanding extra
units of cultural goods. For the second alternative, only the budget constraint will change
(expenditure proportions will remain ￿xed), and for the third the e⁄ect on optimal decisions
will depend on the magnitudes of income and substitution e⁄ects. In any case, the consumer
sovereign norm that is derived from methodological individualism (a basic assumption of our
consumer choice framework) determines that for the two above possibilities not all individual
demand will translate to cultural goods. Regarding the ￿rst possibility, our analysis of the
theoretical model under a static framework has determined that for any level of initial cultural
capital endowment the e⁄ect of public policy will be bene￿cial for the supply side, since the
sum of the new individual demand plus the quantity demanded by the government will
exceed the initial demand.
But we can also think of an argument that is outside our model: the role of the cultural
capital stock that is aggregated in a society jointly with physical cultural assets and used
as production factor (in the sense of Throsby, 1999). We have considered this only as a
personal resource that can be used only for the ful￿llment of cultural appreciation needs.
However, we know that at a macro level this kind of human capital is integrated into the
overall human capital stock. On this basis there could be an additional argument for public
intervention.
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